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PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF MUTUAL-FUND INVESTORS
IN SALES OF MANAGEMENT-CORPORATION CONTROL
(OR, POLICING THE TRAFFIC IN OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY)*
THE investment company brings together participating investors to whom it
sells securities of its own issue, and professional managers who, utilizing the
proceeds of these sales, select and purchase securities in other enterprises on
behalf of the investors.1 Today, investment companies commonly take the form
of mutual funds, which make continuing public offers of redeemable shares of
participation in the fund.2 Like any investment company, a fund may be a
trust or a corporation; and its portfolio may be managed either by its trustees
or directors, or, alternatively, by a separate management corporation to which
the fund has contractually delegated this function.3
Because investment companies were often conducted irresponsibly or dis-
honestly during the 1920's and 1930's, Congress passed the Investment Com-
pany Act to regulate them and place them under the supervision of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. 4 Congress sought specifically to end flagrant
*SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S.L.
Wsru, 3112 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1958).
1. See generally STEVENSON, Sa.EAs IN MUTUAL FUNDS 14 (1946); ROBINSON, IN-
VESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ch. 1 (rev. ed. 1929).
2. See STEVENSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 27-32, 46-48. See also Carter, Mutual In-
vestment Funds, 27 HARv. Bus. REV. 715 (1949).
3. See STEVENSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 49; ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra note 1, at
31-48.
4. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1952), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (Supp. V, 1958) [Hereinafter cited and referred to as the "act."
Sections of the act will be cited as they appear in the Statutes at Large, that is, without
the prefatory United States Code section number, 80a; e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 will be cited
as § 1. Although §§ 30-52 of the act differ numerically from the corresponding United
States Code citations, a U.S.C. section number for one of these sections may be ascer-
tained by subtracting I from the Statutes at Large section number. E.g., § 36 corresponds
to § 80a-35 in the United States Code.].
For the conditions prompting the act, see S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11
(1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9-10 (1940). See also § 1(b); SEC,
REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. I, at 35-36 (1939), pt.
III, at 2-11 (1940) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT] (tracing growth of investment com-
panies statistically in terms of total assets and number of companies) ; Tolins, The Invest-
minet Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77, 80-83 (1940). The abusive practices
which accompanied the investment industry's phenomenal growth caused serious losses to
investors and led to public indignation. FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (1931) ;
Note, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 269, 271 n.23 (1941) (collecting authorities). See Hearings on
S. 3580 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 783-805 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (estimating inves-
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abuses flowing in part from ineffective investor authority over the choice of
the companies' managers, and to safeguard the investors' interest in the exer-
cise of that choicer Consequently, the act attempts to limit the dominant, co-
tor loss as a result of managerial misconduct at over $1 billion). But see Bosland, The
Investment Company Act of 1940 and Its Background, 49 J. PoL. EcoN. 477, 526-29 (1941)
(disputing this estimate). During the market and business decline of the 1930's investor
losses were aggravated by continued managerial misconduct. See SEC REPORT pt. III, at
26-27. As a result, Congress authorized the SEC under § 30 of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 to investigate the investment industry. 49 Stat. 837 (1935), 15
U.S.C. § 79z(4) (1952). The four-year study conducted by the SEC furnished Congress
with empirical groundwork for the act and revealed, inter alia, wholesale looting, self-deal-
ing, trafficking in control, and conversion of trust assets for personal gain. SEC REPORT
pt. III; Senate Hearings 37-39. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F.
Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Bal-
lantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941), discussed in Senate Hearings 57-80
(representative cases involving fraudulent practices). For the inadequacies of the com-
mon law and legislation prior to the act, see Note, 44 HARV. L. REV. 117 (1930) ; Comment,
46 YALa L.J. 1211, 1217-26 (1937).
For the act's regulatory scope, see Loss, SECURITEs REGULATION 94-102 (1951). For
typical provisions, see § 9 (certain persons declared ineligible to serve as officers, directors,
members of advisory board, investment advisers, depositors, or principal underwriters of
any registered investment company) ; § 10 (affiliations of directors regulated) ; § 17 (man-
agement self-dealing banned) ; § 18 (capital structure regulated) § 27 (maximum sales
load and management fees prescribed).
The act also expanded the purview of the disclosure provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 88, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1952) ; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 892, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1952). It thereby eliminated the
loopholes by which investment companies were either exempt from, or evaded, registration
with the SEC under those acts. Note, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 269, 287-88 (1941). Disclosure
provisions include § 8 (publication of investment policy required; unless investors vote
otherwise no change from same allowed) ; § 20 (proxies) ; § 24 (sales literature) ; § 30
(periodic reports to SEC and shareholders) ; § 31 (financial records; SEC discretion to
prescribe uniform accounting practices). See generally Jaretzki, The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303, 315-17, 340-43 (1941) ; Comment, 50 YAIE L.J.
440, 444-46 (1941). The act in its present form is a watered-down version of the original
bill drafted by the SEC at the conclusion of its investigation. For the original bill, see
Senate Hearings 1 (Waguer-Lea Bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)). The invest-
ment industry's objections to the original bill, see Senate Hearings 325-754, led to a com-
promise measure drafted by a joint committee representing the SEC and the investment
industry. Loss, op. cit. supra at 97; see S. RE'. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940) ;
H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940). The industry had objected primarily
to the alleged vagueness and uncertainty of the bill, and the delegation to the SEC of
"broad grants of authority to make rules for the industry which had the force of law."
Bosland, supra at 688. The act passed Congress without debate.
For a comparison of the original bill and the compromise measure, see Thomas, The
Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 918 (1941). "The original bill
... was a true control measure and the latter [present act] but a mere disclosure meas-
ure . .. ." Id. at 923-24.
5. An active trade had developed in managerial control positions. Control of invest-
ment companies was often acquired for purposes of resale at a profit, unloading of worth-
less securities, or expropriation of assets. See Senate Hearings 39; SEC REPORT pt. III,
at 1020-23. This trading was so pronounced that brokers specialized in the sale of invest-
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optative powers of management, for they can independently govern a transfer
of managerial control--especially if the investment company is an entity sep-
arate from the management corporation and thus lacks an integral manage-
ment of its own.6 To protect investors in such dual-entity organizations, the
act includes, among other provisions, section 15 (a) (4), which stipulates that
the sale of control of a management corporation automatically terminates the
service contract between that corporation and the investment company.7 Re-
ment-company control. Id. at 1078. Transfers of control were generally secretive, the in-
vestors being informed after a sale's consummation. Id. at 1024-27; Senate Hearings 38.
Shifts in investment policy, modification of investor rights, imposition of costly manage-
ment contracts, self-dealing, and outright looting of assets often followed high-priced sales
of control. SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1024-31, 2765-66, 1078-357 (details of these control
transfers). See generally Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
584, 607-10 (1940).
Various devices had been employed by investment-company management to prevent
effective investor control. Rarely did any person or organized group own a majority of
the voting shares or participating certificates. Voting trusts, warrants, proxy machinery
control, management contracts, and the pyramiding of companies were usually employed
by management as control devices. SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1874-934. On occasion, when
stock ownership was utilized to retain control, the capital structure of the investment com-
pany was arranged to facilitate minimal holdings by the managers. For example, control-
ling shares were granted as compensation for promoters' services. Id. at 1085; O'Connor
v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 177 S.E. 852 (1935) ; Comment, 46 YALE L.J.
1211, 1216-17 (1937). Broad grants of charter powers, exculpatory clauses, and the dis-
organization of investors helped perpetuate management's insulated position. Id. at 1220;
SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1924 n.253; Senate Hearings 38. See also notes 51, 53, 86 infra
and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of management contracts as a control device and the many abuses
inherent in the dual-entity investment organization, see SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1918-36.
When the management corporation is a separate entity, transfer of control is facilitated,
since control lies with a majority of the shares in the (usually) closely-held management
corporation-as opposed to a majority of shares of participation in the larger, more widely
held investment company. For examples of control transfers through contract assignment
or sale of majority stock in management corporation, see, e.g., Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28
N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1089-90, 1278-303, 2765-67. A sale
of stock in the management corporation also avoids the common-law prohibition against
the assignment of personal-service contracts. The corporate person in effect retains the
contract. See SEC, REPoRT oN FIXED AND SEMII-FLxED INVESTMENT TRUSTS 39 (1940).
7. The interaction of §§ 15(a) (4) and 2(a) (4) of the act achieves this result.
Section 15(a) (4) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person (§ 2(a) (27) defines
''person" as a natural person or corporation) to serve as the "investment adviser" of an
investment company unless pursuant to a written contract which provides "for its auto-
matic termination in the event of assignment" by the manager. (Section 15 (b) (2) similar-
ly restricts the investment company's "principal underwriter.") Section 2(a) (4) defines
the term "assignment" to include "any direct or indirect transfer ... of a contract ... by
the assignor, or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by a
security holder of the assignor."
Sections 15(a) (2), (b) (1) also provide that no contract may
continue in effect for a period more than two years from the date of its execution
[unless] . . . continuance is specifically approved at least annually by the board of
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instatement of the contract can then be effected by a majority of the investors,8
or, according to a section of the statute of unclear import, by a majority of
the independent members of the investment company's board of directors, if
it has one.9 The termination and reinstatement sections alone, however, do not
cope realistically with management's capacity to accomplish a sale of control.
Furthermore, a narrow, pre-emptive interpretation of section 15(a) (4) can
severely restrict the common-law rights and remedies of investors.
The act's shortcomings and their implications are illustrated by a recent
Ninth Circuit decision, SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.10 The case involved
a mutual-fund investment organization comprising: investors who purchased
certificates of participation in a "Trust Fund" (the mutual fund) which had
no directors or executive officers of its own; a trustee limited to the perform-
ance of custodial functions; and Insurance Securities Inc., a management
corporation which served as the Fund's investment adviser and marketed its
certificates of participation." Among the defendants were the four original
directors or by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of such com-
pany.
Further, § 15 (a) (3) provides that investment advisory contracts
may be terminated at any time, without the payment of any penalty, by the board
of directors of [the] . . . registered company or by vote of a majority of the out-
standing [stockholders] ... on not more than sixty days written notice ....
For the companion provision inhibiting transfers of control in the single-entity situa-
tion, see § 16. For the evil at which § 16 is directed, see Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d
622, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1877-81 (illustrations of the seriatim
resignation device for control transfer on the board of directors).
8. See § 15(a) of the act; SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 649 n.12
(9th Cir. 1958).
9. Section 15 (c) of the act applies to any investment company "having a board of
directors" and stipulates that:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... to enter into [or] ... renew ... any contract .. unless
the terms of [the] ... contract . . . have been approved (1) by a majority of the
directors who are not parties to such contract or agreement or affiliated persons of
any such party, or (2) by the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities
of such company.
This requirement is "in addition to " those in §§ 15 (a) and (b). Since § 15 (a) apparently
requires all contracts to be approved initially by the investors alone, the force of § 15(c)
(1.) is unclear. If the reinstatement of a contract is a "renewal," then § 15(c) (1) could
govern. See § 15(a) (2). But if reinstatement is tantamount to "entering into" an original
contract, § 15(a) would seem to require investor approval despite the language of § 15
(c) (1).
10. 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3112 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1959).
11. The separation of the Trust Fund (the mutual fund) from Insurance Securities
(the management corporation) made the organization a typical dual-entity operation. The
organization was created under California law by a trust agreement. Parties to the agree-
ment were the Bank of America (later replaced by the Pacific National Bank of San
Francisco) as the trustee, the management corporation, and the "holders from time to time
... of Participating Agreements ... ." Amended Trust Agreement by and Between In-
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promoters of the investment organization. They had sold their controlling
shares in Insurance Securities, but retained a thirty-per-cent stock interest,
four executive positions, and four of the nine directorships in that corpora-
tion.12 Prior to this sale, the four, then the majority shareholders, had recog-
nized that, under section 15(a) (4), the impending transfer of control would
surance Securities Inc., and Pacific National Bank of San Francisco, and Investors, p. 1,
Oct. 23, 1957 (as amended), on file in Yale Law Library [hereinafter cited as Trust
Agreement]. The bank, in compliance with the terms of the trust agreement, delegated
its managerial functions to the service corporation. Id. at 7, 11, 12. As a result, the trus-
tee was only a custodian holding legal title to the trust's securities and performing certain
minor administrative functions. Id. at 12, 16.
This form of organization fosters conceptual anomalies. See SEC REPORT pt. I, at 19
n.10. One commentator suggests that the management corporation is the settlor, the banl
is the trustee, and the purchasers of participation certificates are the cestids. See RoBII,-
SoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36 (remarks by George S. Franklin). This theory appears
doctrinally unsound, because the beneficiaries are unascertainable at the time the trust
agreement is executed, and because the investor provides the trust res himself. Hence, in-
vestors are best characterized as both settlors and cestuis. See 2 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND
TRUSTFzS § 249, at 80-81 (1953) ; cf. Trust Agreement, art. V, § 1 ("as if such Investor
had personally executed this Trust Agreement").
Under §§ 4 and 5 of the act, which characterize investment companies in terms of func-
tion rather than legal form, the arrangement in the principal case would be deemed an
"open-end diversified management company," i.e., a mutual investment fund. An "open-
end" company is defined as one "which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeem-
able security of which it is the issuer." § 5(a) (1). "Diversified" is defined in § 5(b) (1).
The net receipts from the instant investment organization's public offerings were in-
vested in stocks of various insurance companies. Trust Agreement, pp. 22-23. As of Feb-
ruary 1957, the net assets of the Trust Fund totaled over $225 million. Prospectus, Trust
Fund sponsored by Insurance Securities Incorporated, p. 8, April 1, 1957, on file in the Yale
Law Library [hereinafter cited as Prospectus]. Insurance Securities, Inc. received a "crea-
tion fee" on the sale of each participation agreement. It also received fees for administer-
ing the Fund and for investment supervision. 254 F.2d at 645. Aggregate, gross fees re-
ceived during 1955 were nearly $5 million. Ibid. The service corporation engaged in no
other business. Id. at 644.
12. Id. at 644-46. See Prospectus, pp. 13-14 (defendants listed among the nine direc-
tors).
The shares in Insurance Securities, Inc. have been closely held since its incorporation.
Prior to the sale, the four director-defendants held an aggregate of 72% of the outstanding
shares, with the balance owned by five individuals not parties to the suit. 254 F.2d at 645.
The defendants sold about 40% of the outstanding shares, retaining 31.2%. The purchasers
bought an additional 13% from other individual holders, thus acquiring a total of 53%. Id.
at 646. The director-defendants claimed that their combined sale of 40% of the stock was
not a transfer of control within the meaning of § 2(a) (9) of the act, which presumes
25% to equal control, since no individual defendant owned as much as 25%. Brief for
Appellees, pp. 9, 94-104. Nonetheless, the court recognized that the stock transactions
constituted transfer of control. 254 F.2d at 650.
The four defendants retained their directorships and the principal corporate offices after
the sale. Id. at 644. The head of the purchasing group was elected vice-president and a
director. Id. at 645. One of the defendants eventually resigned as president, becoming
chairman of the board, and the head of the purchasing group was then elected president.
Record, p. 34.
1958]
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automatically terminate the management corporation's service contract."3 Since
the Fund had no board of directors, it was clear that only the investors would be
able to reinstate the contract.14 Accordingly, the four defendants "synchro-
nized" the time of sale of their majority interest with a meeting of the Trust
Fund investors called by the management corporation to vote reinstatement
on the contract's termination.15 Each investor having received from the cor-
poration-still controlled by the four defendants-a proxy and a proxy state-
ment recommending the contract's renewal,'0 the sale of control was consum-
mated and the service contract reinstated.17
The SEC brought suit against the director-defendants because they had re-
ceived for their controlling shares a price far exceeding the net asset value of
the stock sold.' 8 Arguing that the transaction therefore constituted "gross
misconduct" and a "gross abuse of trust" proscribed by section 36 of the act,19
13. Prior to the effective date of the sale, the corporation, under the four defendants'
direction, solicited proxies authorizing the contract's reinstatement. The proxy-solicitation
material sent to the investors stated that the service corporation "'is advised' that the
'change in majority ownership' of ISI stock 'may be considered an assignment' of these
[investment-advisory and underwriting] contracts and that such assignment may have had
'the technical effect' of terminating the contracts." Brief for Appellant, p. 11. See Record,
pp. 21, 33, 119.
14. See 254 F.2d at 649 n.12; see also -note 9 supra.
15. Record, pp. 33-34. The method used was that one of the defendants retained suffi-
cient stock to give the four majority control (approximately 55% of the shares) until
just prior to the effective date of the contract's reinstatement. Ibid.; note 17 infra. See
also note 12 supra (court treated all sales by the four as concerted sale of control).
16. The management corporation indicated to the investors that it "favored" the re-
instatement of the management contract. Record, pp. 42, 46.
17. The contract of sale called for the sale's consummation "on the same day as, but
immediately prior to, the effective time of the [contract's reinstatement]." Record, pp.
67-68. The sale was so consummated. Brief for Appellees, p. 8 n.7.
Prior to the scheduled meeting of the investors, the SEC had obtained a preliminary
injunction restraining the management corporation from voting the proxies. Later, the
court, by agreement of the parties, removed the restraining order. Brief for Appellant, pp.
13-14. Following this action, the management corporation voted the proxies for reinstate-
ment of the contract. Record, p. 141. The court had, however, reserved jurisdiction "to
grant any and all relief . . . sought by the plaintiff . . . including any action with respect
to the . . . Contracts, whether or not approved by Investors in the Trust Fund, if it is
determined in a final decree that plaintiff is entitled to judgment . . . ." Record, p. 95.
The management corporation insisted that the sale of control was "not conditioned on"
but was "synchronized with" reinstatement of the service contract. Record, pp. 33-34. Had
reinstatement not been voted by the investors, however, the sale of control could have been
rescinded. Otherwise, the defaulting purchaser would then have been in technical breach
of contract. See Record, pp. 67-68. In this event, the director-defendants might have been
reluctant to insist on the sale and thus force the corporation to lose its contract under
§ 15(a) (4), since, after the sale, they would remain substantial minority shareholders.
See note 12 supra.
18. 254 F.2d at 644; Brief for Appellant, p. 12.
19. 254 F.2d at 644.
Section 36 of the act reads as follows:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court . . .
alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the following capacities
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the Commission sought on behalf of the investors both an accounting and an
order restraining the defendants from acting as directors of the management
corporation. 20 The trial court dismissed the complaint 21 and was affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit, apparently on two alternative grounds.
First, the appellate court looked to the statute. Relying on section 1 (b) (6),
which declares transfers of control without investor consent inimical to public
policy,2 2 the court concluded that the SEC may object to such a transfer not
on the basis of excessive profits made by the transferors, but solely on the
ground that the investors did not express approval of the transferees-who
would constitute the new management. 23 The court then reasoned that, be-
cause section 15 (a) (4) gives investors an opportunity to deny reinstatement
of the service contract and thus to disapprove the transfer of control,24 Con-
gress intended 15(a) (4) to provide the exclusive means for effectuating the
policy of section 1 (b) (6) .2r The Ninth Circuit therefore held that "the terms
has been guilty ... of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust in respect of any
registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts:
(1) as officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser, or
depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end company,
unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If the Commission's allegations of such ... gross abuse of trust are established, the
court shall enjoin such person from acting in such capacity or capacities either per-
manently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem appropriate.
For another count in the SEC complaint, see note 52 infra.
20. 254 F.2d at 647. The requested accounting was for the difference between the sales
price and net asset value of the stock. Id. at 647, 650-51.; Brief for Appellees, p. 15.
21. SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ("The
courts are not overall supervisory agents of all the morals, equities or standards in the
field regulated by the Act. We have enough to do to apply and interpret the statutes as
the Congress writes them.').
22. Section 1(b), found under "Findings and Declaration of Policy," states that
"the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected... (6) when
investment companies are reorganized, become inactive, or change the character of their
business, or when the control or management thereof is transferred, without the consent of
their security holders . . . !'
Section 1 sets forth seven other abusive practices which are against public policy, see
254 F.2d at 648 n.11, and concludes with the statement that "the policy and purposes
[of the act] . . . are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions
enumerated ......
23. Id. at 648-49.
24. Id. at 649 n.12. Section 15(a) (4) is discussed in note 7 supra.
Section 15(c), dealing with reinstatement when the investment company has its own
board of directors, is quoted in note 9 supra.
25. Id. at 651. The court also relied on legislative history for the proposition that
§ 15(a) (4) constitutes an exclusive "specific remedy."
In its original form, these additional words appeared at the end of this subdivision:
"... and without adequate public supervision." In the final form of this subdivision,
the quoted words were deleted. This indicates that Congress believed that the only
1958]
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'gross misconduct' and 'gross abuse of trust' as used in § 36 of the act were
not intended to embrace" sales of control such as that at bar.26
Alternatively, the decision maintains-possibly arguendo-that, even if sec-
tion 15 (a) (4) does not preclude using section 36 to implement the legislative
policy against a transfer of control without the consent of investors, the SEC
had still failed to demonstrate either "gross misconduct" or "gross abuse of
trust." 27 Replying to the view that section 36 embodies common-law equi-
table principles, 28 the Ninth Circuit found that these principles had not been
violated because the director-defendants had neither sold a fiduciary office nor
appropriated an asset of the Trust Fund.29 In arriving at this conclusion, the
court assumed that the defendants' positions as the principal owners and
officers of the management corporation made them the investors' fiduciaries.2 0
Even so, the transfer of control through the sale of shares was judged not a
"sale of fiduciary position."'31 The court's theory was that, under section 15
(a) (4), the stock transaction automatically terminated the service contract
and hence ended the fiduciary relationship, which did not arise anew until the
contract was reinstated.3 2 Furthermore, the defendants were not considered
to have appropriated an asset of the Trust Fund when they sold their Insur-
ance Securities stock at a price of $50 a share, although each share's book
value was only $1.81.33 The SEC had contended that, because the difference,
a total of $3,277,000,34 represented the capitalized worth of expected profits
under the service contract, this sum was an asset of the mutual fund rather
than the management corporation." But the court, viewing the Fund's in-
remedy which was necessary with respect to this particular practice was the pro-
vision of § 15(a) (4) for automatic termination.
Ibid.
26. Id. at 651-52.
27. Id. at 649-51. The court's discussion of the alleged § 36 violation may well be
pure dictum and not an alternative ground for its holding.
The trial court had said that § 36 does not cover sales of control in management cor-
porations. SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 780-81 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
28. The court did not rule on the scope of § 36, see 254 F.2d at 648 & n.10, but dis-
cussed it in terms of "historic equitable principles," id. at 649-51.
The only case which has construed § 36, Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946), stated that § 36 "invokes the equity power
of the Federal Court." Id. at 261.
29. 254 F.2d at 650-51.
The court synthesized the diverse arguments of the SEC, see Brief for Appellant, pp.
45-68, and concluded that the Commission was relying on the "two well-established prin-
ciples of equity" forbidding sale of fiduciary office and appropriation of trust assets, 254
F.2d at 649-50.
30. Id. at 650.
31. Ibid.
32. See ibid.
33. Id. at 650-51; the stock's value is set forth id. at 646.
34. Brief for Appellant, p. 12.
35. 254 F.2d at 650.
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terest in the contract as limited to the right to receive managerial services,
indicated that the $3,277,000 belonged solely to the management corporation's
shareholders.30 The Ninth Circuit opinion therefore stands for the proposition
that neither the Investment Company Act nor the common law restricts profits
on the sale of a controlling interest in a management corporation.
Whatever the merit of its views on common-law equity principles, the court
properly assumed that the director-defendants, as owner-operators of the man-
agement corporation, were the Trust Fund investors' fiduciaries. When an
investment organization is a single corporation governed by a charter,3 7 under
prevailing corporate-law doctrine, the individuals who direct the management
have a fiduciary duty to the investors by virtue of management's discretionary
power over the investors' securities. 38 Similar legal responsibility should at-
tach to persons exercising operational control over management in a dual-
entity investment institution, for the same investor-manager relationship exists
with only the formal difference that management derives its authority from
36. Id. at 650-51. For a discussion of the SEC theory that the value of the service
contract was an asset of the Trust Fund, see note 62 infra.
37. See note 3 supra.
38. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649-54 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; O'Connor
v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 919-26, 177 S.E. 852, 857-59 (1935) ; Aldred
Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260-61. (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946)
(common-law trust organized under trust indenture). For cases involving ordinary cor-
porations, see, e.g., Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 90-91 (6th Cir. 1939); Jones v. Mis-
souri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1906). See generally SPELLMAN,
CORPORATE DnIRcroRs § 6 (1931).
The term "fiduciary" is a shorthand description of court-imposed responsibilities. "[T]o
say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.
To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect
has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his devia-
tion from duty?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943). See BALLANTINE,
CO'ORATIONS § 79 (rev. ed. 1946).
Control over the property of others is emphasized by commentators and the judiciary
as one of the important factors giving rise to the fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Southern
Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919) (opinion of the Court per Brandeis, J.)
("It is the fact of control of the common property held and exercised, not the particular
means by which or manner in which control is exercised, that creates the fiduciary obliga-
tion.") ; Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391, 393-94 (8th Cir. 1908) ;
Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918); BERLE & MEANs, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIvATE PROPERTY 233-46 (1932) ; Leech, Transactions in Cor-
porate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 725, 806 n.221 (1956) (discussion of cases).
On discretionary power as an element giving rise to a fiduciary relationship, see 1
MORAWETZ, PRIVAE CoRPoRAIONS § 516 (2d ed. 1886). See also McLure v. Luke, 154
Fed. 647, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1907). On the importance of reliance by the fiduciary obligee
and dominant position of the fiduciary obligor, see, e.g., Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill.
637, 649, 161 N.E. 118, 123 (1928) ("A fiduciary relation . .. exists in all cases where
confidence is reposed on the one side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other
side arises therefrom.") ; Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co., 43 App. Div. 10, 59 N.Y.
Supp. 618 (1899).
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an inter-entity rather than an intracorporate contract.3 9 The exclusive power to
make dispositions of the mutual fund's property is vested in the management
corporation through the contractual delegation of the major functions of the
fund's directors (or trustees). 40 And that corporation alone, as conducted by
the parties directing its management, performs an active entrepreneurial role
for the passively reliant investors.41 Nevertheless, the Insurance Securities
director-defendants argued that, while their corporation had a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the Trust Fund, they, as stockholders of the management corpora-
tion, had no such relationship so far as the sale of their stock was concerned.
42
An analogy was drawn to a sale of control of an ordinary corporation ;43 in
that context, whatever fiduciary duty dominant shareholders and directors may
39. The basic elements of a fiduciary relationship are present: property control, dis-
cretionary function, and dominance coupled with reliance. See note 38 su pra.
Litigation determining the legal consequences of managerial position in a dual-entity
enterprise is rare, possibly because of the legal inhibitions on delegating corporate man-
agerial functions. See 2 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 496 (perm. rev. ed. 1954). In
the few dual-entity cases which have arisen, fiduciary standards have been imposed on
separate-entity managers. See Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910) (mutual in-
surance company having management contract with outsider) ; Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28
N.Y.S.2d 668, 680-85 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (investment company with separate corporate man-
ager) ; Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 456, 458-60, 174 At. 217, 218, 219-20 (Ch. 1934)
(mortgage participation certificate holders with outside service company) ; In the Matter
of Brooklyn Trust Co., 163 Misc. 117, 127-28, 295 N.Y. Supp. 1007, 1018-20 (Sup. Ct.
1936) (same) ; In the Matter of Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 132 N.J. Eq. 170, 176, 28
A.2d 120, 124 (Ch. 1942) (stock insurance company) ; cf. SEC v. W. J. Howey, Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (contracts for sale of land to be developed by service corporation;
registration under securities laws required) ; SEC Securities Act Release No. 3892, Jan.
31, 1958 (securities registration required because elements of single-entity relationship in-
here in dual-entity organization). See generally Douglas, A Functional Approach to the
Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL L. REv. 673, 678-79 (1929) ; Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 540 (1949).
40. See Trust Agreement, pp. 18, 22. See also note 11 supra.
Management-corporation contracts with investment companies are recognized as formi-
dable vehicles of control. SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1874-934; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
417 (rev. ed. 1946). In the principal case the bank's function more closely approximated
that of an agent than a trustee, and the management corporation in effect exercised the
trustee's functions. Cf. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS ANiD TRUSTEES 73 (1952) ; 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 8.1
(2d ed. 1956). A party who by the terms of a trust indenture holds power over the trus-
tee to control and manage property has the fiduciary responsibility of the trustee even
though another party is named trustee in the indenture. Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114,
125, 123 N.E. 135, 138 (1919) ; City of Boston v. Dolan, 298 Mass. 346, 10 N.E.2d 275
(1937) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 185 (2d ed. 1956).
41. In the principal case, the management corporation performed the basic functions
normally performed by managers in the single-entity organization. See Trust Agreement,
pp. 18, 22. On the passivity of investors, see SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-
300 (1946) ; BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 66.
42. See Brief for Appellees, pp. 22, 48-49. The trial court may have accepted this
argument. See SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
Brief for Appellees, p. 87.
43. Brief for Appellees, pp. 9, 24, 65-71.
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have extends only to the corporation and its minority stockholders.4 4 The
analogy is inapposite, however, when the corporation is a fiduciary to an out-
side obligee, because those who dictate the managerial decisions in such a cor-
poration may then be the immediate fiduciaries to the same obligee with re-
spect to a sale of their control position.45 Thus, in Insurance Securities, the
44. For extensive discussions of control sales in the single-entity context, see Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957) ; Jennings, Trading in Cor-
porate Control, 44 CALI. L. REv. 1 (1956) ; Leech, supra note 38, at 774-835.
In a few cases directors have been held accountable to outside creditors and receivers
for misappropriation of corporate assets. Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 92
S.W. 1131 (1905) (creditor); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901) (re-
ceiver). Directors may also be made liable to outsiders by statute. See SPELLmAx, op. Cit.
supra note 38, at 622-35.
45. Parties in a position to control an individual or a corporation have been held fidu-
ciaries to the fiduciary obligees of the individual or corporation. Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488, 492 (1919) (parent corporation held fiduciary to minority share-
holders of corporation controlled by subsidiary of parent) ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec.
Co., 144 Fed. 765, 771-76 (8th Cir. 1906) (collecting cases) ; Ripperger v. Allyn, 25 F.
Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (security dealers controlling directors of a corporation
held fiduciaries to corporation) ; see Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y.
483, 489-90, 121 N.E. 378, 380 (1918). For Investment Company Act recognition of this
control concept, see definitions of "affiliated person," § 2(a) (3), and "control," § 2(a) (9).
Cf. Loss, SEcURTIEs REGULATION 453-68 (1951) (discussing liability under the Securities
Acts of persons exercising control or controlling influence). See also note 47 infra.
When the corporation is a trustee, the fiduciary status of corporate officials is clear.
The directors and officers are in a fiduciary relation not merely to the institution itself but
to the beneficiaries of the trusts administered by the institution. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 326.3
(2d ed. 1956). Accord, Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 344,
87 AtI. 444 (Ch. 1913), aff'd, 83 N.J. Eq. 353, 91. Atl. 1070 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914) ; Cart-
wright v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 167 Pac. 436 (1918) ; Gay v.
Young Men's Consol. Co-op Mercantile Inst., 37 Utah 280, 107 Pac. 237 (1910). See also
cases cited note 39 supra.
Similarly, subagents are frequently held to have a fiduciary responsibility to their
principal's principal. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1955) ;
cf. City of Boston v. Dolan, 298 Mass. 346, 349, 10 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1937) (collecting
cases). If, in the principal case, the Trust Fund is regarded as the principal, Insurance
Securities Inc. as the agent, and its directors as subagents, the directors would be fidu-
ciaries to the Trust Fund. Their fiduciary responsibility would then be commensurate
with the extent of their discretionary authority. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 14, com-
ments b, c (1933) ; Scott, The Fiduciary Priciple, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 541 (1949).
For discussion of the legal consequences and policies incident to sales by fiduciaries of
their control positions see notes 55-62 infra and accompanying text. See also Ballantine v.
Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 680-82, 684-85 (Sup. Ct. 1941), discussed in Leech, supra note
38, at 786-87 (sale of control in dual-entity context held illegal) ; American Trust Co. v.
California V. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 68, 98 P.2d 497, 510 (1940) (sale of con-
trolling stock in insurance company direct fiduciary breach to "outside" policyholders);
cf. Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910) (sale of management contract and at-
tendant fiduciary-control position over mutual insurance company) ; Jennings, supra note
44, at 6-8 (discussing erosion of early theory that directors owe fiduciary duties to entity
but not to "outside" stockholders).
Were the controlling owners of a separate management company to sell their shares,
they could be compelled by the minority shareholders of that company to account for the
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director-defendants had an immediate fiduciary responsibility to the mutual-
fund investors which was breached when, by selling control of the manage-
ment corporation, the defendants also transferred control of the Fund. More-
over, since the Trust Fund had no directors of its own and the trustee vested
with the directors' duties remained passive,46 the legal responsibilities of Trust
Fund directors could have been imputed to the dominant persons in the man-
agement corporation who supervised the Fund. 47 An imputation of this sort has
not only common-law but also statutory support, for the Investment Company
Act imposes the same fiduciary duties on management-corporation and invest-
ment-company directors.48
Although the court accurately characterized the defendants as fiduciaries of
the mutual fund, its determination that their fiduciary office was not trans-
ferred through the sale of controlling shares in Insurance Securities seems
untenable. True, the sale of stock, working a technical termination of the ser-
proceeds received for control of that company. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
Thus, in a sense, the controlling shareholders could have a fiduciary responsibility to
the minority shareholders to maximize the amount received for control. Anomalously, such
a duty would be opposed to the controlling shareholders' obligation to the investors in the
investment company-not to profiteer on a sale of control.
46. The Insurance Securities Trust Agreement vested management powers in the trus-
tee, but provided for the delegation of those powers to the management corporation. Trust
Agreement, pp. 18, 22. Thus, the officers and directors of Insurance Securities Inc. per-
formed the administrative and discretionary duties which ordinarily would be vested in a
trust-fund board of directors. Under the Trust Agreement, art. X, § 1 (m), the delegated
powers would revert to the trustee upon severance of the management corporation's con-
tract. In practice, the Insurance Securities management retained those powers by arrang-
ing for the contract's reinstatement. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. Much
of Insurance Securities' discretionary authority was later assumed by a newly created
Trust Fund board of directors. See Trust Agreement, Supplemental Agreements, pp. 1-2,
Sept. 17, 1956.
47. Closely-held personal-service corporations are especially susceptible to this sort
of "veil-piercing," whereby directors are treated as if they were the managers of the trust
fund rather than of its corporate manager. See 1 O'NEAL, CLosE COP0RATIONS § 1.09
(1958). The corporate person may not be interposed simply to evade fiduciary responsi-
bility. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311. (1939) ; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note
38, § 122; Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55
CoLum. L. Ray. 808, 815 nn.51 & 52 (1955).
48. The act does not distinguish between management-corporation and investment-
company directors. See § 2(a) (12) of the act (defining "director"). See also § 2(a) (3)
(defining "affiliated person"). Various provisions in the act impose the same stringent
duties upon management-corporation (and investment-company) directors as are generally
required of trustees. Compare § 17(e) (1) wilth REsTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 206, comment k
(1935) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] (accepting commissions from transferees of
trust property improper). Compare §§ 17(h), (i) with RESTATEMENT § 222 (exculpatory
clauses forbidden). Compare § 9 with REsTATEMENT § 107, comment b (ineligibility of
certain persons to serve in fiduciary capacity). Compare § 17(a) with REsTATEmENT




vice contract by operation of section 15 (a) (4), and thus theoretically ended the
fiduciary relationship between the management corporation and the investors,
and discharged everyone in that corporation of his fiduciary duties to the in-
vestors. In actuality, however, the renewal of the contract was a manifestation of
the dominance and control over the investors upon which the director-defendants'
fiduciary status was based.49 The sale of control did not occur until after the
transferors had utilized the investment organization's proxy machinery to
frame the reinstatement issue, comment favorably upon the purchasers of con-
trol, solicit investor votes, and recommend the renewal of the service con-
tract. 0 Reinstatement was further assured by the facts that the investors were
apathetic and unorganized,"' and the transferors and transferees had withheld
from them knowledge of the amount paid for corporate control.52 Moreover,
even if the SEC had required a full disclosure of all information, a dissatisfied
investor would have been more likely to redeem his certificate of participation
than to incur the costs of proxy solicitation incident to contesting reinstate-
49. Moreover, whether the defendants' fiduciary relationship in respect to the Trust
Fund beneficiaries ceased before or after the sale may be immaterial for determining lia-
bility. See Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Ati. 428 (1914) (resignations from fiduciary
positions antedated sale, but defendants held accountable notwithstanding) ; Wright v. Mor-
gan, [1926] A.C. 788 (P.C.) (N.Z.) (sale of trust property to former trustee follow-
ing the latter's resignation held illegal) ; cf. Shelton v. Homer, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 462
(1843) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (quoted note 56 infra) ; Gaskell v.
Chambers, 26 Beav. 360, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1858) (discussed note 55 infra).
50. See notes 13, 16 supra. See also Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-1.1.
On the advantages attending control of proxy machinery, see SEC REPORT pt. III, at
1876-77; BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 80-90, 139, 244-46. See also Hill, The
Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. Rzv. 986, 996-98 (1957) (discussing the power to
frame proxies); EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMocRAcY 41-42 (1954) (man-
agement recommendations on ballots usually allowed) ; Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings
and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REv. 653, 681-86 (1951.) (dis-
cussing the inability of investors to nominate other candidates) ; Note, 53 H.av. L. REv.
1165, 1167-68 (1940) ("It is only when an outside group solicits proxies in opposition to
those in control . ..that the shareholder is apt to receive information concerning un-
favorable aspects of the proposed measure.").
51. On the apathy and disorganization of shareholders generally, see BERLE & MEANS,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 81; Dodd, Is Effective Enforcentent of the Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194, 197-98 (1935) ; The Chicago
Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463, 474-75 (1948) (dispersion of stock ownership gives rise to "control-
ling influence" by management). See also note 86 infra.
52. The SEC had complained that the proxy material was "false and misleading" in
violation of SEC Rule X-14A-9, promulgated under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n "(1952). (SEC Rule N-20A-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.20a-1 (1949), issued under § 20(a) of the Investment Company Act, makes appli-
cable the proxy rules issued by the SEC under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act.) Brief for
Appellant, pp. 103-12. Rule X-14A-9 prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of any
representation which "omits to state any material facts necessary to make any statement
in the proxy material not false or misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1949). Among the
material facts which the SEC alleged had been omitted was the "price received
by the director-defendants for their ISI stock, the net asset value of the . .. stock,
and the pecuniary benefits the director-defendants had realized as a consequence of the
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ment.53 Hence, control over the proxy machinery can virtually assure renewal
of a previously existing service agreement. Since, in Insurance Securities, this
control was actually exercised to achieve reinstatement of the agreement, ter-
mination of the contract was illusory, and the powers and fiduciary duties
arising from it remained throughout in the management corporation. Defend-
ants therefore had fiduciary positions which they effectively transferred through
the sale of their controlling stock.
The Ninth Circuit's assumption that a technical termination of the service
contract necessarily precludes a sale of fiduciary office not only is erroneous
but also (even if it were correct) fails to consider another possibility-that
dominant shareholder-directors might exploit their ability to influence inves-
tors voting on the contract's reinstatement.5 4 Like a sale of office,r a sale of
influence would violate the equity rule that a fiduciary may not take advantage
sale of stock control." Brief for Appellant, pp. 104-05. (The SEC also complained of the
statements quoted in note 13 supra. Id. at 105.)
The SEC complaint made the issue of a Rule X-14A-9 violation "expressly dependent"
upon the resolution of alleged "gross abuse of trust" proscribed by § 36. Id. at 15, 105.
Neither the trial nor appellate court reached the Rule X-14A-9 count, since the SEC lost
on the § 36 count. See SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 781 (N.D.
Cal. 1.956) ; 254 F.2d at 652.
53. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YAix L.J. 1477, 1486 (1958) ; cf. Jaretzki, The
Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303, 308 (1941). See also Aranow
& Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Expenses of Management and Insurgents, 42 COR-
NELL L.Q. 4 (1956).
Since the Trust Fund was an "open-end" company (mutual fund), the certificates of
beneficial interest were redeemable at the option of the holder. Trust Agreement, art. V,
§ 4; see note 11 supra.
54. For steps taken to influence investors in the principal case, see notes 16, 52 supra
and accompanying text.
55. Sale of a fiduciary office constitutes a breach of trust at common law. Sugden v.
Crossland, 3 Sm. & Giff. 192, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch. 1856) (trustee) ; Gaskell v. Cham-
bers, 26 Beav. 360, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1858) ; Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (1880)
(trustee of corporation) ; McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899) (corporate
director) ; Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 114 N.W. 1047 (1903) (guardian) ; Oak-
eshott v. Smith, 104 App. Div. 384, 93 N.Y. Supp. 659 (1905) (executor) ; Eddy v. Capron,
4 R.I. 394 (1856) (public official).
This prohibition extends to sales by indirection under guise of a stock transfer as well
as to outright sales of office. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914) ; Bosworth
v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901) ; Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 679
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
Sale of management and control may be viewed as either a "sale of office" or "compen-
sation for loss of office." See Jennings, Trading In Corporate Control, 44 CALn'. L. REV.
1, 19 (1956). The latter doctrine is supposedly derived from Gaskell v. Chambers, supra,
see Heinemen v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 551, 92 S.W. 1131, 1,132 (1905), and the
former from Sugden v. Crossland, supra, see McClure v. Law, supra. Nonetheless, the
Sugden. and Gaskell courts rested their holdings on the same basic principle. The argument
accepted by the court in Gaskell was that "trustees can derive no benefit from their trust,
every advantage which they can obtain from it belongs to their cestuis qui trust." 26 Beav.
at 362, 53 Eng. Rep. at 938. And Sugden states that "if a trustee makes a profit of his
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of his position for personal gain r6 nor divert to himself opportunities which
he may pursue only on behalf of his fiduciary obligee.5 7 Strict adherence to
this rule is justified lest self-interest deflect management from its duty of un-
trusteeship, it shall enure to the benefit of his cestui qui trusts." 3 Sm. & Giff. at 194, 65
Eng. Rep. at 621.
The common principle underlying Gaskell and Sugden finds present-day expression in
the "corporate asset theory," which some commentators assume to be the basis for Perl-
man v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See Jennings,
supra at 9. According to that theory, "the power going with 'control' is an asset which
belongs only to the corporation; and ...payment for that power, if it goes anywhere,
must go into the corporate treasury." BE.LE & MEANs, op. cit. supra note 38, at 244. For
discussion of the theory, see Jennings, supra at 30-31.
56. A fiduciary may not sell his influence with respect to his fiduciary obligee. West
v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507, 520 (1890) ; Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1926) ;
Reed v. Catlett, 228 Mo. App. 109, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934); Clark v. First Nat'l Bank,
219 Iowa 637, 259 N.W. 211 (1935); Sauerhering v. Rueping, 137 Wis. 407, 413, 1.19
N.W. 184, 187 (1909).
Thus, use of proxy machinery to effectuate a sale of influence should also be prohibited.
See Hill, supra note 50, at 993-94, 998 (since directors may not take money for resigning
and putting in buyers directly, they should not be allowed to do so through the proxy
machinery) ; cf. Cochrane v. Cochrane, [1922] 2 Ch. 230 (trustee with power to appoint
his successor cannot accept payment from the appointee). The Supreme Court has enun-
ciated the following proposition applicable to either a sale of office, see note 55 supra, or
a sale of influence:
He who is in a fiduciary position cannot .. .utilize his . . .strategic positiolb for
his own preferment. He cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through
the corporation what he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for his
personal advantage ...no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and
no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). (Emphasis added.) See also MECHEs, AGENCY
353-54 (4th ed. 1952) ; BALLANTINE, CoaPo0ATiONs 218-19 (rev. ed. 1946).
57. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1945) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 311 (1939) ; Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947) ; Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 465, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (1928) ; cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173, 176-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
The Perlman case, if viewed as a "corporate opportunity" decision, see Jennings, supra
note 55, at 11-13, presents an analogy to the principal case. In Perlnan, the purchasers,
seeking a source of supply in a tight steel market, bought control of a corporate supplier.
The purchasing group may have been just as willing to buy the steel directly at high
prices as to buy it indirectly through purchasing stock in the supplier at a premium. Cf.
Hill, supra note 50, at 1008. Analogously, the purchasers of Insurance Securities Inc.
sought, in part, an outlet for the managerial services of Leland M. Kaiser and his asso-
ciates. See Record, pp. 55-88 passim. Thus, they paid $4,240,720 for the controlling shares
of a corporation with a service contract. 254 F.2d at 646. Presumably, they would have
been equally willing to enter into a direct agreement with the Trust Fund and to perform
services for $4,240,720 less than the Trust Fund was presently paying, amortized over a
term of years. If this assumption is correct, the director-defendants in effect diverted a
bargain purchase of managerial services to their own profit. Cf. Pouzzner v. Westerly
Theatre Operating Co., 67 F. Supp. 874 (D.R.I. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 821 (Ist Cir. 1947)
(lease and sublease) ; Paw Paw Sav. Bank v. Free, 205 Mich. 52, 171 N.W. 464 (1919)
(same); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.F.2d 522 (1948) (pur-
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divided loyalty to the investors.5 s8 When offered an attractive profit, a seller
is tempted to overlook any lack of managerial skill on the part of the prospec-
tive purchasers, or their possible intention of looting the investment company's
funds.50 Moreover, the seller may demand a purchase price which his succes-
sors can recoup only by exacting excessive service charges from the inves-
tors.60 In contrast, if the controlling stockholder-directors know that undue
profits on the sale must be accounted for, their self-interest will not inhibit
the exercise of responsible judgment in the selection of their transferees.0 1
Both to promote such diligence and to prevent unjust enrichment, the com-
mon law holds the fiduciary liable for selling his influence or his office, irre-
spective of whether the investors are actually harmed by the transfer of con-
trol.62
chase and resale); Gilmore v. Gilmore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 123 Atl. 730 (1924)
(same). In any event, the Trust Fund was deprived of the opportunity to bargain with
the purchasers. See Leech, supra note 38, at 741 (denial of remote opportunity illegal) ;
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 465, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (1928) (opinion of the court
per Cardozo, C.J.).
58. Meinhard v. Salmon, supra; note 57, at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546 (1928) ; Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) ; Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262,
267-69 (1941). See generally Scott, Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REV. 521
(1936); MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 56, § 500; 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
8 861.1, at 224 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947) (collecting cases).
59. See Leech, supra note 38, at 779-96; Hill, supra note 50, at 1019-22, 1025-26, 1032;
cf. Senate Hearings 883.
60. See Brief for Appellant, p. 80. But see Brief for Appellees, pp. 61-63.
61. See Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 653-54 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Leech, supra
note 38, at 795 & n.193 ; cases cited note 58 supra. (In the principal case, the SEC did not
impugn the transferees' integrity.)
62. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest on the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal
of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from
a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Accord, Irving
Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.,
323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948) ; Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 680 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) ; see MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 56, §§ 501, 508; Jennings, supra note 55, at
11-13 (measure of recovery when fiduciary diverts opportunity to self is gain to the fidu-
ciary, not harm to fiduciary obligee).
Any personal gain arising on account of fiduciary position is deemed unjust enrich-
ment. L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 105, 11 N.W.2d 329, 342
(1943) ; Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 89 So. 2d 799, 815 (Miss. 1956) ; Bailey
v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 Atl. 320, 324 (1937); RESTATEMENT, RESTrIUTION §
197(a), (c) (1937).
Nonetheless, the SEC in the principal case evidently attempted to demonstrate that the
sale of the service contract harmed the Trust Fund because the value of the contract was
an asset of the Fund. See notes 34, 35 supra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit
treated the problem in terms of harm to the Fund. 254 F.2d at 650-51.
The price received by appellee-directors for their stock in the service company
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Although the Ninth Circuit in Insurance Securities evidently assumed
arguendo that the common law was applicable, 63 it erred in ruling out the
possibility of a sale of office and in ignoring the problem of a sale of influence,
for the trial court had not made findings on these issues.64 Had the lower
court applied common-law standards, it could not have properly disposed of
the SEC complaint without first examining the entire stock transaction (in-
cluding the sales price) to determine whether the defendants had in fact ex-
ploited their fiduciary positions. Central to such an analysis would be the val-
uation of the shares sold-a complex calculation since, like many management
corporations, Insurance Securities is a closely-held personal-service corpora-
tion whose stock is not actively traded.6 5 On the one hand, the value of the
purchased shares could not legitimately include a premium for defendants'
having used the proxy machinery or their influence to assure reinstatement of
the service contract. 6  On the other, the legal worth of the shares could justi-
fiably reflect the chance that the investors would voluntarily reinstate the con-
tract; thus, the stock's value might exceed that of the management corpora-
tion's net assets.6 7 Consequently, to the extent that the sales price included
compensation for defendants' efforts to secure reinstatement, the defendants
did not come from the coffers of the investment company, but from outside pur-
chasers.
Id. at 651. (Emphasis added.) The SEC's argument that the service contract's value was
an asset of the Trust Fund could be viewed as an application of the "corporate asset
theory." See note 55 supra. The asset would be a complex bundle of control powers be-
longing to the Trust Fund which were sold and exploited, not a tangible corporate asset.
63. See notes 27, 28 supra and accompanying text.
64. The trial court had also ruled out the possibility that the retention of some part
of the sales price violated a fiduciary duty owed the Trust Fund. See SEC v. Insurance
Securities Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
65. See 254 F.2d at 645.
On the difficulties of valuing the stock of closely-held personal-service corporations,
see 1 O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (1958) ; 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY
720-27, 1047-74 (1937). For discussions of the various methods of valuing corporate stock,
see Comment, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 689 (1957); Comment, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 295 (1958).
66. See notes 54-58, 62 supra.
67. The purchasers apparently looked to "investment value" or "going concern value"
as the basis for the price paid. See 254 F.2d at 651. (Insurance Securities had no business
other than servicing Trust Fund. See note 11 supra.) For discussions of these concepts,
see Comment, 55 MicH. L. REv. 689, 693 (1.957) ("investment value" is an estimate of
present worth in light of past, present, and prospective financial records) ; Comment, 5
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 295, 300 (1958) ("going concern value"). For other valuation methods,
see id. at 298-301.
In the ordinary nonfiduciary situation, payment for the expectation of contract renewal
is legitimate. In the fiduciary situation, however, the means of achieving contract rein-
statement must also be considered, for they may involve a violation of fiduciary responsi-
bility. See notes 16, 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
See also Hill, supra note 50, at 986, 994-95; Jennings, supra note 55, at 9-10, 26-28
(control value of stock must be segregated from investment value and disallowed) ; Leech,
supra note 38, at 756-57 (constricting the market for shares by excluding fiduciary obligee
from market artificially and illegally increases their value; compare note 57 supra).
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should have been required to account for their profits. But in so far as the
price was based on the expectation that the efficiency and reputation of the
purchased organization would lead to reinstatement, the money received in
excess of net asset value was rightfully retained. 68
To summarize, the Insurance Securities trial court should have ascertained
both that portion of the sales price, if any, constituting an unjust enrichment
of the fiduciaries, and that portion fairly attributable to the anticipated earn-
ings of an organization capable of performing valuable services. A court seek-
ing to isolate the components of the sales price should consider, among other
variables, the experience of the management personnel remaining after the
sale of control, the value of any special investment formula employed by the
management corporation, the likelihood that the management corporation will
acquire a service contract from another investment company, and the reputa-
tions of the individual purchasers as stock analysts and underwriters.6 9 The
court might also find relevant the impermanent nature of a management con-
tract, for the statute empowers an investment company's directors or investors
to terminate a contract on sixty days' notice; and causes every contract to
expire annually.70 Thus, the would-be managers can theoretically solicit and
68. The price would then reflect the legitimate "going concern value" generally accepted
by the courts. See Comment, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 295, 300 (1958) (collecting cases) ; Com-
ment, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 689-92 (1957). But see Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir.
1910) ; Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 682 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (sellers of control
held fully accountable; no consideration given to organization value).
69. Specific factors to consider would include the management corporation's record
system, sales staff, office personnel, research analysts, statisticians, quality of library facil-
ities, economists, and physical assets. If only a corporate shell was transferred, the sales
price could legally reflect only the value of the corporate name.
In Insurance Securities, two key employees of the management corporation were 79
and 82 years old. Their impending retirement was known to the investors. Record, pp.
65, 118, 131. This factor should have been considered, and the legitimate value of the man-
agement corporation's stock determined. (Apparently, retirement was later postponed.)
Cf. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 722, 725 (1937) (director's death in close cor-
poration affects value of his stock) ; Note, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 687, 691 (1958). Coincident-
ally, in Insurance Securities, four key employees who actually remained with the corpora-
tion, see text at note 12 supra, thus adding to its value, were the defendant-fiduciaries, see
notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text, who thus would be liable for a purchase price
exceeding the corporation's value.
70. See §§ 15(a) (2), (b) (1), (a) (3) of the act, quoted note 7 supra. Ordinarily,
provisions in a contract making it terminable on sixty-day notice or requiring its annual
renewal depress its market value because of the risk of discontinuance. See Senate Hear-
ings 585, 586-88, 590-92. Also, § 15 (a) (4), see note 7 supra, theoretically depresses the
value of management corporation stock by terminating a service contract on a sale of con-
trol. The intended effect of §§ 15(a) (2), (b) (1), (a) (3), (a) (4) is reflected in the
following statement.
Here you have a situation where a person assumes a fiduciary obligation; he is
the manager of other people's money. If he is through with the job, he ought to go
home. However, instead they take these 10-year contracts which they have the right
to assign to someone else.
This provision says that the management contract is personal, that it cannot be
[Vol. 68:113
SALES OF CONTROL
obtain a service agreement without purchasing any shares in the incumbent
management corporation. 71
In Insurance Securities, however, the Ninth Circuit intimated that the fore-
going considerations need not be reached because section 15(a) (4) obviates
the resolution of a transferor's liability under common-law fiduciary stand-
ards. 72 The court said that section 15(a) (4), by terminating a management
corporation's service contract upon a transfer of qontrol, limits section 36,
which, the decision implies, might otherwise incorporate the common law into
the act.7 3 The very terms of section 15(a) (4), the court reasoned, manifest
Congress' intent to provide no further remedy against profiteering on sales of
control.7 4
This reasoning appears unsound. Section 15(a) (4) is directed at transfers
of control without shareholder consent, as distinct from profiteering on a trans-
fer of fiduciary office. 75 Hence, the section on its face hardly compels the con-
clusion that it is the exclusive antidote for such conduct. The omission of a
specific profiteering provision from the act probably reflects a congressional
belief that section 15 (a) (4) would prove an effective prophylaxis against all
sales of fiduciary positions and, a fortiori, against profiteering from such
sales.76 The legislature's probable expectation is frustrated whenever, as in
Insurance Securities, the termination of a service contract by operation of
section 15(a) (4) is merely illusory. 77 Nonetheless, the congressional policy
assigned, and that you cannot turn over the management of other people's money
to someone else.
Id. at 253.
71. The burden of proof in establishing the value of purchased shares would probably
rest on the defendant fiduciaries. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177, 178 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955) ; Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 275, 5 A.2d 503,
512 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Jennings, supra note 55, at 10 n.38 (collecting cases and authorities);
cf. Hill, supra note 50, at 1025-28, 1031.
72. See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
75. A distinction between a transfer of fiduciary position and profiteering from a
transfer is recognized at common law. The latter is proscribed; a mere transfer is not
unless the transferor is aware of the transferee's intention to waste or loot the assets of
the fiduciary obligee. According to a number of commentators, the seller of controlling
stock may retain the price paid if it represents only the market value or "investment
value" of his shares and not a premium for control. But when the price paid for the stock
reflects a premium for "control itself," the seller must account. See, e.g., Jennings, supra
note 55, at 9-11.
Similarly, a trustee may have the power to appoint a successor, i.e., transfer his con-
trol, but he may not accept payment from his appointed successor. Cochrane v. Cochrane,
[1922] 2 Ch. 230. And a trustee without a power of appointment may recommend a suc-
cessor but may not accept payment from him. Cf. Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Giff. 192,
65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch. 1856). See also Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1910)
(management contract).
76. See Senate Hearings cited and quoted at note 70 supra (indicating belief that man-
agement contracts would cease to be tradable commodities).
77. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
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underlying the entire statute can and should be implemented on those occasions
that section 15 (a) (4) fails to achieve its intended purpose. Since the act was
designed to provide regulation beyond that available under the common law,78
Congress presumably sought to guarantee investors at least the minimal com-
mon-law protections.79 The Ninth Circuit therefore seems incorrect in its
view that those restrictions which are statutorily explicit exhaust the act's
coverage.80 The statute could not have enumerated every conceivable abuse
and anticipated every fact situation which might arise in the field of investment
companies.8 ' The general, proscriptive wording of section 36-forbidding
"gross misconduct" and "gross abuse of trust' ' 2-indicates that the legisla-
ture recognized this impossibility and enacted that section to embrace all such
78. See, e.g., § 2(a) (4) and § 15(a) (4) (treating sale of control in a management
corporation as equivalent to assignment of contract) ; § 10 (regulating affiliations of direc-
tors) ; § 16(a) (directors may not be appointed by existing directors unless majority of
those making the appointment were elected at meeting of investors); § 17(i) (banning
exculpatory clauses) ; § 49 (establishing penalties).
79. See Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 955, 103-04 (1951); cf. id. at 1042; Senate
Hearings 308-09; Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 871 n.287 (1958).
80. See 254 F.2d at 651 & n.14. See also id. at 649.
Even a criminal statute embraces everything which subsequently falls within its scope.
See Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1941) ; Puerto Rico v. The Shell
Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253, 257-58 (1937).
The untenability of the Ninth Circuit's enumerated-evil, specific-remedy approach is
further demonstrated in connection with § 16, which was designed to proscribe the seriatim
resignation device used by members of boards of directors to sell control of single-entity
investment organizations. See note 7 supra; Senate Hearings 254. Section 16(a) provides:
No person shall serve as a director of a registered investment company unless
elected to that office by the holders of the outstanding voting securities of such
company, at an annual or a special meeting duly called for that purpose.
If the rationale of Insurance Securities were followed, § 16 would be considered the
only remedy necessary to effectuate the policy of § 1(b) (6), quoted note 22 supra, since
§ 16 insures the investors' consent to a new management. Consequently, if a majority of
the directors of a single-entity investment company were to contract for a substantial con-
sideration with a purchasing syndicate to resign their directorships and use their influence
to have the purchasers instituted as new directors, and were then to resign pursuant to
the agreement after arranging for the purchasers' election by the investors, the former
directors would be immune to prosecution by the SEC. So long as the new directors were
voted into office by the investors, the directors who sold their offices would not have
violated § 16. And § 36, see note 19 supra, would not be applicable. This extension of
Inmrance Securities is, of course, in direct conflict with the common law, which would
render the resigning directors accountable for profits received. See notes 55-58, 62 supra
and accompanying text.
81. Aside from the practical impossibility of enumerating all reprehensible investment
industry practices, pressing time limitations which confronted Congress precluded its being
done. For the "haste" with which the act was drafted, see Jaretzki, supra note 53, at 346.
82. See note 19 supra. Originally, "gross abuse of trust" was drafted to constitute an
"unlawful" act. After the investment industry had objected to having criminal liability
turn on such an imprecise standard, Congress deleted the criminal sanctions. See Jaretzki,
supra note 53, at 344; Senate Hearings 1056.
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misconduct illegal at common law and not treated elsewhere in the act.83
Furthermore, the specific language of the act's other sections suggests that,
had section 36 been written to effect a particular or limited goal, it would have
been more precisely drafted. In sum, the fulfillment of congressional policy
requires that profiteering on the transfer of a fiduciary position be considered
a violation of section 36.
Once "gross misconduct" and "gross abuse of trust" in section 36 are con-
strued to forbid profiteering by fiduciaries through a sale of control, further
problems may arise in securing adequate relief.8 4 Section 36 expressly enables
the SEC to seek only injunctions.8 5 Strictly construed, the section would deny
the Commission the right to an accounting and thus make that effective remedy
contingent on investor-initiated litigation at common law. So to restrict the
SEC to injunctive relief would substantially vitiate section 36, for investment-
company shareholders ordinarily lack adequate information and financial re-
sources to sue for an accounting.86 Moreover, an injunction is of limited
utility after a management corporation's dominant shareholder-directors have
unjustly enriched themselves on a sale of corporate control; they and possibly
their vendees can be enjoined only from acting as directors and officers of the
corporation. Complete relief would therefore necessitate the wasteful procedure
of two separate actions, one by the Commission for an injunction under sec-
tion 36, the other by injured investors for an accounting at common law.
83. Wording basically similar to that presently found in § 36 appeared originally as
part of the self-dealing provision (§ 17) in the original draft of the act. See Senate Hear-
ings 12 (§ 17(e)). This provision was omitted, and § 36 was included in the act without
specific reference to a particular type of a transaction. See Thomas, The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 918, 937 (1941.).
Judicial interpretation has emphasized the broad scope of § 36. See Aldred Inv. Trust
v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). For the in-
vestment industry's earlier view that the scope of § 36 is too comprehensive, see note 82
supra.
When Congress has made a choice of language which fairly brings a given situation
within a statute, it is unimportant that the particular application may not have been con-
templated by the legislators. Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945). See Ver-
milya-Brown Co., Inc. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 388 (1948); Pickhardt v. Merritt, 132
U.S. 252, 257 (1899); Newman v. Arthur, 109 U.S. 132, 138 (1883).
84. In Insurance Securities, the SEC requested both an accounting and an injunction.
See text accompanying note 20 supra. The remedy issue was not reached, since the Com-
mission lost on the merits.
85. "If the Commission's allegations of such gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
are established, the court shall enjoin such person from acting in such capacity or capac-
ities either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem appro-
priate."
86. See Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1211, 1220 (1937) (scattered and unorganized inves-
tors find litigation expensive, satisfaction of judgment doubtful, procedural problems pro-
hibitive) ; Dodd, supra note 51, at 197-98 (investors lack, inter alia, information necessary
to prove their case); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4, 9 (1940) (statistical
analysis showing investment-company certificate-holders are from economic classes un-
familiar with corporate practice) ; Note, 44 HAR,. L. Rav. 11.7, 118 (1930) ; cf. EMFmsoN
& LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 146-49 (1954). See also note 51 supra.
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Imperfect relief is not inevitable, however. In fact, the better and broader
construction of section 36 would grant the SEC the right to both an account-
ing and an injunction, and would thereby promote the efficient enforcement
of orders and judgments against fiduciaries. Although the section does not
specifically provide for an accounting, an inference to this effect is supported
by general judicial practice. Courts interpreting section 36 and similar pro-
visions of other regulatory statutes have often held that explicitly prescribed
remedies are not exclusive.8 7 Restitution, receivership and an accounting have
all been granted as appropriate complements to injunctive relief if the fulfill-
ment of legislative purpose so required.88 Similarly, the congressional design
to eliminate abuses in the investment industry dictates that section 36 be read
to accord the SEC an accounting remedy against profiteering.
Liberally construed section 36 remedies alone, however, will not advance
the aims of the Investment Company Act satisfactorily. The threat of an SEC
suit under section 36 may well prove insufficient to prevent fiduciaries from
circumventing section 15(a) (4)'s contract-termination provision and selling
their offices and influence. The alternative-strict SEC enforcement of section
36 in every instance of suspected profiteering-would engender intricate liti-
gation, for each case would turn on the proper valuation of the controlling
shares in a given management corporation operating under particular circum-
stances.8 9 Congress should avoid placing this burden on the Commission and
the judiciary, and should amend the act to enable the investment companies
themselves to protect investors against managerial profiteering.
87. Remedies other than an injunction which have been granted under § 36 include
the appointment of a receiver, Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946), and the issuance of a liquidation order, Bailey v. Proc-
tor, 160 F.2d 78 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 331. U.S. 834 (1947), 34 VA. L. Rrv. 56 (1948).
For relief under another section of the act, see SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712
(D. Del. 1943) (granting a receivership under § 4Z(e), which provides for general en-
forcement powers).
Under the Emergency Price Control Act § 205 (a), 56 Stat. 33 (1942), which provided
only for injunctive relief, restitution (accounting) was granted in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 15(a) (3),
52 Stat. 1068, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (3) (1952), was similarly interpreted in Walling v.
O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944). And in United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616
(1951), restitution of overceiling rentals was awarded under the Housing and Rent Act
of 1949, § 206(b), 63 Stat. 27, 50 U.S.C. § 1896 (1952), which specifically provided solely
for an injunction or order enforcing compliance. Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936) (preferential transfer of property set aside even though
New York corporation statute provided only for the liability of transferors) ; Reitmeister
v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (citizen given civil damages under criminal
wiretap statute). See generally Loss, op. cit. supra note 79, at 1083-86.
88. See cases cited note 87 supra.
89. For the intricacy of such a valuation, see, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp.
436 (D. Conn. 1957) (determining the "investment value" of stock apart from its control
value), on renand from 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). See also the valuation issue as diq-
cussed in the first trial of Pernman, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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Such an amendment would regulate the reinstatement of a service contract
following its termination under section 15 (a) (4). Two measures are indicated.
First, Congress should replace the statutory provisions which allow a manage-
ment corporation's board of directors to serve, in effect, as the investment
company's,9 0 and which, when separate boards are established, permit a minor-
ity of the investment company's directors to be affiliated with the management
corporation.91 Instead, every investment company in a dual-entity investment
organization should have a board of directors all of whom are unaffiliated with
the management corporation. ° -2 Moreover, because affiliation is difficult to
prove,9 3 a second safeguard should be adopted to ensure autonomous action
by the investment company's board in selecting the management corporation.
90. All sections of the act dealing with separate investment-company boards of direc-
tors leave their creation to management's discretion. See, e.g., §§ 10, 15(c). In the prin-
cipal case, no such board existed originally but one eventually was established. See 254
F.2d at 645 n.1.
91. Section 10(b) of the act provides:
... no registered investment company shall-
(2) use as a principal underwriter of securities issued by it any director, officer,
or employee of such registered company or any person of which any such director,
officer, or employee is an affiliated person, unless a majority of the board of direc-
tors of such registered company shall be persons who are not such principal under-
writers or affiliated persons of any of such principal underwriters ....
Under § 10(a), only 40% of the board need be unaffiliated with the "investment adviser."
Section 2(a) (3) broadly defines "affiliated person" for purposes of § 10. For a discus-
sion of § 10, see Comment, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 446-49 (1941).
If the separate investment-company board chooses to reinstate a management contract,
§ 15(c) allows only members unaffiliated with the management corporation to vote on
reinstatement. Section 15(c) is quoted in note 9 supra. See also Thomas, supra note 83,
at 935; Brief for Appellant, pp. 40-41. Even without a vote, however, the board members
affiliated with the management corporation are likely to influence a decision of the board
to reinstate a management contract. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224
N.Y. 483, 489-90, 121 N.E. 378, 379-80 (1918).
92. See note 91 supra. For illustrations of boards of directors dominated by one or
two individuals, see Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Elec. Co., supra note 91 ; Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 274, 5 A.2d 503, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Greene v. Allen, 114
A.2d 916, 920 (Del. Ch. 1955), rev'd sub nor. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del.
1956) ; Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1936). See also dominating-influence
cases cited note 45 supra.
The investment industry opposed adoption of the provisions of § 10 limiting the number
of investment-company directors who could be affiliated with management corporations.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings 347, 412-13, 416, 510, 544, 572, 578, 621, 655.
The Trust Fund in the principal case now has its own board. See note 90 supra. In-
surance Securities Inc. domination probably remains, however. See Prospectus, pp. 13-14;
note 93 infra.
93. In the instant case, for example, only three of the seven members of the Trust
Fund's new board are formally affiliated with Insurance Securities Inc. See § 10(b) (2)
of the act. The four "unaffiliated" members, however, are former directors of Insurance
Securities, and one is apparently a relative of the chairman of the board of that manage-
ment corporation. Prospectus, p. 11. For the act's definition of "affiliation," see § 2(a) (3).
Proof of actual affiliation under § 2(a) (3) (c) would require evidence demonstrating that
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Whenever section 15 (a) (4) operates to terminate a contract, the investment
company's directors should be required to arrange for the solicitation of com-
petitive bids for a new management agreement.94 The directors would then
review the bids and award the contract to that corporation offering the most
favorable combination of managerial competence and low service charges. As
a result, the purchasers of controlling shares in the incumbent management
corporation could no longer be certain that the corporation's service contract
would be reinstated pro forma by the investment company. And, whether
purchasing control or not, prospective managers would have to deal directly
with the investment company's board of directors-an independent body with
its allegiance solely to the investors. Premiums currently paid the controlling
shareholders of management corporations for their strategic positions would
therefore be channeled to the shareholders of the investment company through
improved services or a reduction in service fees.95
The proposed amendment, coupled with the SEC's present authority to re-
quire the disclosure of information,96 should place separate-entity investment
companies under effective SEC supervision while enabling them to protect the
interests of their investors. The Commission could elicit from the investment
companies detailed reports on the competitive bidding for and execution of
management-corporation contracts. Similarly, management corporations could
be compelled to notify the SEC of an impending sale of control and the price
which the new owners pay for their controlling shares: the Commission might
also demand such data as a description of the organizational structure of the
purchased corporation, the value of its physical assets, and the previous ex-
an "unaffiliated" Trust Fund director was subject to the "control" of his friends or asso-
ciates formally affiliated with the management corporation.
See also SEC REPORT pt. III, at 1875 (initial directors of investment companies are
appointed by sponsoring corporation) ; Caplin, supra note 50, at 681-86 (investors do not
nominate directors but approve management's nominees).
94. Of course, the competitors would have to be bona fide management companies
with adequate facilities, experience, etc.
For discussions of competitive bidding in the underwriting industry, see Robbins, Com-
petitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 27 HARV. Bus. REV. 646, 652-54, 663 (1949) (com-
petitive bidding increases yield to issuer and reduces "spread" of underwriter) ; Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 264-67 (1951) (promotes arm's-length dealing).
95. See note 57 supra.
96. Section 30(a) of the act subjects investment companies to § 13(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, which requires companies covered by it to file with the Com-
mission such information and reports as the Commission may by rule prescribe "as neces-
sary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors . . . ." 48 Stat. 894 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78m (1952). At present, reports must be filed within ten days after the close of
any month during which specified events of a somewhat extraordinary nature occur.
Among the events enumerated are a change in control of the "parent" of the registrant.
SEC Rule X-13A-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1949); Form S-K, 2 CCH FEM. SEc. L.
SE vscE 31003 (1954). Investment companies which are required to file quarterly re-
ports are currently exempt from this rule. SEC Rule X-13A-1l. See generally Loss,
SEcuairTrs REGULATION 492-94 (Supp. 1955).
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perience of any new officers or directors. The Commission should therefore be
able to detect misconduct and bring a section 36 action for abuse of trust
against any investment-company board of directors preferring the interests of
an incumbent management corporation above those of the investors. Moreover,
investors seeking guidance in the purchase and sale of their participation cer-
tificates could obtain copies of the investment-company and management-cor-
poration reports.9 7 Thus, the directors of an investment company, besides be-
ing unaffiliated with the management corporation and limited in their discre-
tion by compulsory competitive bidding, would be subjected to the salutary
pressures of SEC surveillance and potential investor disaffection. These mani-
fold restraints should greatly inhibit profiteering on a sale of control. They
should also relieve the courts of having to undertake valuations of controlling
shares, since the reinstatement of a management-corporation contract could
be arranged in advance only by suborning the independent board of directors.
Hence, cases would be unlikely to arise in the posture of Insurance Securities.
More important, investors would receive the benefits which Congress felt it
had guaranteed in section 15(a) (4), but which can be readily denied so long
as the managers of separate-entity investment companies can select their suc-
cessors.
97. Section 45(a) of the act states:
The information contained in any registration statement, application, report, or other
document filed with the Commission pursuant to any provision of this subchapter...
or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall be made available to the public,
unless and except insofar as the Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own
motion, or by order upon application, finds that public disclosure is neither neces-
sary nor appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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